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The "Natural Law Tradition"
John Finnis
It scarcely makes sense to talk of a natural law tradition. For "natural law"
(in the context of ethics, politics, law and jurisprudence) simply means the
set of true propositions identifying basic human goods, general require-
ments of right choosing, and the specific moral norms deducible from those
requirements as they bear on particular basic goods. But there is a tradition
of theory and theorizing about natural law (and the preceding sentence, a
contemporary instance of such theorizing, is in line with the classics of that
,tradition). This "tradition of natural law theory" has three main features:
First, critique and rejection of ethical scepticism, dogmatism and conventionalism;
Second, clarification of the methodology of descriptive and explanatory social theories
(e.g., political science, economics, jurisprudence .... );
Third, critique and rejection of aggregative conceptions of the right and the just (e.g.,
consequentialism, utilitarianism, wealth-maximization, "proportionalism"..
In jurisprudence, the concerns of the tradition are to show:
(1) how an understanding of law presupposes a practical understanding (i.e., an under-
standing of the point, the good) of community, justice and rights, and authority-as
reasons for choice and action;
(2) how a definition (i.e., a summary of one's understanding) of law can and should
include a reference to the moral functions or point of law (especially, but not only, the
procedural "ideals" of the Rule of Law), without thereby excluding immoral laws from
the lawyer's perception of the study of jurisprudence;
(3) how positive laws are derived from natural law (moral principles) in at least two
radically different ways;
(4) how unjust laws, being laws, can sometimes create moral obligations, but always lack
the moral authority (and thus a part of the character) which laws, by virtue of being
lawfully made, characteristically have.
A. Against Ethical Scepticism, Dogmatism, Conventionalism
(a) Sceptical denials of at least one basic human good (truth and knowl-
edge) are self-refuting. Natural law theory is a theory which tries to account
for the fact that doing it (or questioning it) is worthwhile. Theories which
make no room for the fact of their own existence, or for the worth of their
own pursuit, are self-refuting.
(b) Most contemporary scepticisms about the basic human goods, and/or
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the requirements of practical reasonableness, are based on a logically illicit
slide (particularly common in the modem era) from "is" to "ought". For
example:
* I have a sentiment of approval of X; so X is good (worthwhile .... or obligatory .... or
*I am committed to, have adopted, have opted for, have chosen, have decided upon... the
practical principle that X... ; so X ought to be done
* in modern thought/contemporary society, X is widely regarded as [not] good/obliga-
tory, so X is [not] good/obligatory
* X is not universally/commonly regarded as good/obligatory, so X is not good/
obligatory.
Explicit natural law theory was launched, by Plato and Aristotle, precisely as
a critique of non sequiturs such as these. These theorists, and followers such
as Aquinas, respect the distinction between is and ought, fact and value,
much more carefully than, for example, David Hume. Statements to the
contrary are myth or misreading.'
The critique of scepticism is closely linked to the main strategy of
contemporary jurisprudence: attention, not merely to the externals of struc-
ture, practices or even feeling, but rather to the characteristic reasons people
have for acting in the ways which go to constitute distinctive social pheno-
mena (such as law). Jurisprudence attends to types of justifications for
decision.
Note: being concerned with truth, natural law theory is quite distinct from
political movements, whether conservative, liberal, radical, or whatever.
B. On the Methodology of the Social Sciences
It can be shown conclusively that "analytical jurisprudence" or "descrip-
tive sociology of law," launched by Bentham, and developed by Austin,
Kelsen, Weber, Hart, Raz, and others, escapes methodological arbitrariness
only by presupposing certain evaluations in its selection and/or formation
of concepts for use in its analyses, descriptions and explanations. But it tends
towards arbitrariness insofar as (in the case of Bentham, Austin and Kelsen)
it disclaims and suppresses these evaluations, or (in the case of Weber and
Hart) pronounces them to be undiscussable options or presuppositions. 2
Natural law theory fully recognizes the place of descriptive/explanatory
social sciences (of which the bulk of Aristotle's Politics is an early model),
quite distinct from justificatory/critical practical reasoning about the good
and the right in social arrangements. But natural law theory argues that the
formation and selection of concepts for social descriptions and explanations
is and (unless they are to remain parochial) must be guided by the evalua-
1. For textual verification of the last two sentences, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights 330-38, 470-48, 53-55 (Oxford and New York, 1980).
2. See Finnis, supra note 1, chapter I; and John Finnis, On "Positivism" and "Legal Rational
Authority", 5 Oxford J. Legal St. 74-90 (1985).
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tions which critical reflection on the human situation shows to be critically
justified.
In short, natural law theory tries to do openly, critically, and discussably,
what most other analytical and descriptive theorists do covertly and dogmat-
ically. Once one recognizes the method of definition used by Aristotle (into
central- and secondary-cases, as judged by persons of practical reasonable-
ness), one can see that his social-science methodology (as distinct from some
of his historiographically primitive applications of it) is vastly more sophis-
ticated, and more open to fresh data and improved understanding than much
modem work in these fields.
C. Critique of Aggregative Theories of the Right
More important (for ethics, political theory and jurisprudence) than the
account of basic human goods is the account of the second level of ethical
reflection, identifying the "requirements of practical reasonableness" or
"modes of responsibility." Much modern ethical and jurisprudential
thinking uncritically assumes that reasonableness requires aggregation of
goods or value(s). But outside the contexts established by simple goals
(projects, or the fulfilment of straightforward commitments), there is, in
situations of morally or political significant choice, no net greatest good or
lesser evil to be identified by aggregative calculations or assessments. The
belief that there is is not merely practically chimerical, but incompatible
with free choice, and incoherent.
Human rights, and institutions such as the Rule of Law, justifiably have
the shape they do just insofar as aggregative ethical/political methods are
unjustifiable. Kant's principles of fairness and respect for "humanity" are
much more reasonable than the various utilitarianisms, but these principles
need (and can get) the support of the account of human nature ("humanity")-
and of basic practical principles-provided by the account of basic human
goods.
By going deeper than contractarian theories of authority, or will-based
theories of contract, a theory of natural law can give a better account of
traditional jurisprudential problems such as the formation of binding
customs (such as in international law), the continuity of law through revolu-
tions, the authority of de facto governments, the relations between contrac-
tual and other obligations, the relations between tort and other schemes for
repairing loss, etc.
D. A Note on Teaching Jurisprudence
Jurisprudence, it seems to me, can well be introduced into Introduction to
Law courses:
(a) to show how the procedural/constitutional standards of the Rule of
Law (well expounded in Fuller, The Morality of Law chs. II and VI) relate
law (and our law) to political theory (and to the beliefs and commitments of
our polity), and cash out in highly specific and debatable legal rules and
institutions;
(b) to show how institutions of private law, such as tort, contract, or
bankruptcy, represent moral conceptions elaborated partly by application,
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partly by determination (constructive, nondeductive, and in that sense
"free," implementation or specification of general notions), and then partly
by considerations of consistency which are partly deductive.3
Courses dedicated to "Jurisprudence" need to tackle head-on the methodo-
logical questions suggested above as the framework for fruitful reflection on
the work of specific jurists (it matters rather less which of the substantial
jurists, living or dead). To be reflecting on these questions is to be reflecting
on "natural law theory"; indeed, it is (whatever labels one favors doing
natural law theory-unless, of course, one is determined in advance that the
answers shall come out in favor of scepticism, or "modem-person conven-
tionalism," or methodological parochialism, or some purely aggregative
theory of justice.
3. See, e.g., the reflections on bankruptcy law in Finnis, supra note 1, at 188-93.
